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Efficient Strategy Computation in Zero-Sum
Asymmetric Repeated Games
Lichun Li and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract—Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making
scenarios involving two competing players who have different
information about the game being played. A particular case is
that of nested information, where one (informed) player has
superior information over the other (uninformed) player. This
paper considers the case of nested information in repeated zero-
sum games and studies the computation of strategies for both
the informed and uninformed players for finite-horizon and
discounted infinite-horizon nested information games. For finite-
horizon settings, we exploit that for both players, the security
strategy, and also the opponent’s corresponding best response
depend only on the informed player’s history of actions. Using
this property, we refine the sequence form, and formulate an
LP computation of player strategies that is linear in the size
of the uninformed player’s action set. For the infinite-horizon
discounted game, we construct LP formulations to compute the
approximated security strategies for both players, and provide
a bound on the performance difference between the approxi-
mated security strategies and the security strategies. Finally, we
illustrate the results on a network interdiction game between an
informed system administrator and uniformed intruder.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many competitive settings in which players have
asymmetric information about the underlying state of the
game. Examples include cyber security problems [1], [2],
resource competitions in air transportation systems [3], [4],
national defense [5], [6], economic systems [7], power net-
works [8] and so on. In these systems, because of the non-
cooperation between players, a player usually holds private
information that is not shared with the other players, which
causes the information asymmetry in games.
This paper focuses on two player zero-sum repeated games
with asymmetric information, where one (informed) player
knows the underlying state of the game while the other (unin-
formed) player only knows the prior distribution of the state.
At the beginning of the game, the state of the game is initially
selected, once and for all, at random according to the prior
distribution. Repeated interactions means that players play
over stages and can make observations about past play. Here
we assume the case of full monitoring, i.e. a player observe the
actions taken by both players, and perfect recall, i.e. a player
records the history actions of both players. The one-stage
payoff of the informed player, i.e. the loss of the informed
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player, is decided by the state of the game and the actions of
both players. Notice that the payoff is not directly observable
to both players, but the informed player can compute the
payoff since he/she knows the state of the game and the
actions of both players. The fact that the one-stage payoff is
unavailable to the uninformed player happens in practice. For
example, when jamming wireless sensor networks, the attacker
may observe which channel the network uses (action of the
informed player), but cannot measure the throughput in the
channel (payoff of the informed player) [1], [9].
We first study finite stage (N-stage) repeated asymmetric
games. These games were studied in [10] with a random
payoff. Besides actions of players, the payoff is also a common
information in [10]. Based on these common information,
the authors designed an asymptotically optimal strategy for
the uninformed player such that the worst case relative loss
of the uninformed player is either finite or increasing with
rate log(N) as N goes to infinity. This paper adopts the
game model in [6], [11] with fixed payoff function that is
not available to the uninformed player. We are interested in
computing security strategies of both players, i.e. the Nash
equilibrium of the finite stage game. Notice that with the
assumption of mutually absolute continuity in [10], the game
model in [10] is neither more nor less general than the one
in this paper. Since the finite stage repeated asymmetric game
has finite state set, finite action sets of both players, and finite
stage, it can be expressed as a finite game tree. With perfect
recall, the security strategies of both players can be computed
by solving a linear program whose size is linear with respect
to the size of the game tree, i.e. polynomial in the size of the
action sets of both players, linear in the size of the state set,
and exponential in the time horizon [12]. Meanwhile, the other
prior work showed that both players had a security strategy
that is independent of the history actions of the uninformed
player [6], [13], [14]. This paper shows that if a player uses a
strategy that’s independent of the uninformed player’s history
actions, then the opponent’s best response is independent of
the uninformed player’s history actions, too. It implies that
a player does not need to record the history actions of the
uninformed player to compute the security strategy, which is a
violation of the perfect recall. The challenge is how to develop
a linear program without perfect recall as required by previous
work [12] to compute the security strategies for both players.
For the informed player, to conquer the challenge, we started
from the recursive formula of the game value, and develop an
LP to compute the security strategy. For the uninformed player,
to conquer the challenge, we cut the branches expanded by the
uninformed player in the game tree, introduce the expected
payoff at the leaf nodes, and construct an LP to compute the
2security strategies. Moreover, the sizes of the linear programs
developed in this paper are only linear in the size of the action
set of the uninformed player as compared with prior work that
had polynomial dependence.
We then extend the time horizon to infinity, and study
discounted repeated asymmetric games. Compared with finite
stage games, discounted repeated asymmetric games has two
main challenges. The first challenge is that it is necessary to
find out fixed sized sufficient statistics for each player, since
history based strategy requires a great amount of memory to
record the history action as time horizon get long. The second
challenge is that computing the game value and the security
strategies of both players is non-convex [15], [16]. We need
to find an approximated security strategy for each player with
guaranteed performance.
For the informed player, the first challenge has been ad-
dressed in the previous work [6], and the sufficient statistics
of the informed player is the posterior probability of the
state of the game conditioned on the history action of the
informed player, which is also called the belief. For the second
challenge, we first use the game value of a finite stage (N -
stage) discounted game, a truncated version of the infinite
stage discounted game, to approximate the game value of the
infinite stage discounted game, and then use an LP similar to
the one in finite horizon games to compute an approximated
security strategy based on the approximated game value. Such
an approximated game value is shown to converge to the true
game value exponentially fast, and the difference between the
game value and the worst case payoff of the approximated
security strategy has a finite upper bound which converges
to 0 exponentially fast with respect to N . The technique
used in this section is adopted from our previous work [17]
which focused on the informed player’s approximated security
strategy in discounted stochastic asymmetric games. This
paper further studies the strategies of the uninformed player.
For the uninformed player, the belief can not be the unin-
formed player’s sufficient statistics because of its dependency
on the informed player’s strategy. To figure out the sufficient
statistics of the uninformed player, [13], [14] studied the dual
game of the infinite stage discounted repeated game (primal
game), and showed that the security strategy of the uninformed
player in the dual game with a special initial regret (a real
vector of the same size as the belief) is also a security strategy
of the uninformed player in the primal game. Moreover, [13],
[14] also showed that in the dual game, the sufficient statistics
of the uninformed player is anti-discounted expected vector
payoff realized so far conditioned on the history action of the
informed player and the possible state of the game, which
is called anti-discounted regret in this paper. Based on the
results in the previous work, we first transform the primal
game into a dual game with a special initial regret, and then
compute an anti-discounted regret based security strategy for
the uninformed player. The problem is what the special initial
regret is. This paper shows that the special initial regret is
the difference between 0 and the worst case payoff of the
uninformed player’s security strategy given every possible
state of the game in the primal infinite stage discounted game.
Computing the special initial regret is non-convex. Therefore,
we use the worst case payoff of the uninformed player’s
security strategy given every possible state of the game in
finite stage discounted game to approximate the one in the
infinite stage discounted game, and construct a linear program
to compute it. Given the approximated initial regret, computing
the uninformed player’s security strategy in a dual game is still
non-convex. We first use the game value of a finite stage (N -
stage) dual discounted game, a truncated version of the infinite
horizon dual discounted game, to approximate the game value
of the infinite stage dual discounted game, then construct an
approximated security strategy of the uninformed player in
the dual discounted game based on the approximated game
value, and finally develop an LP to compute the approximated
security strategy for the uninformed player in the infinite stage
dual discounted game. Using the same technique as for the
informed player and the relations between the game values of
the primal and dual games, we show that in the infinite stage
primal discounted game, the difference between the worst case
performance of the uninformed player’s approximated security
strategy and the game value is always finite, and converges to
0 exponentially fast with respect to N .
This paper extended the results in our previous work [18]
from finite stage to infinite stage. For infinite stage games, we
adopt the technique in our previous work [17] which studied
the approximated security strategy of the informed player in
discounted stochastic game, and extends the results from the
informed player to the uninformed player. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the main
results for finite stage games. Section III discusses discounted
infinite horizon games. Section IV illustrates the results on a
network interdiction game. Finally, Section V presents some
future work.
II. FINITE STAGE ASYMMETRIC REPEATED GAMES
Notation. Let Rn and Z+ denote n-dimensional real space and
positive integers, respectively. Given a finite set K , its cardi-
nality is denoted by |K|, and ∆(K) is the set of probability
distributions over K . The vectors 1 and 0 are appropriately
dimensioned column vectors with all elements being 1 and
0, respectively. For v(0), v(1), v(2), ... a sequence of real
numbers, we adopt the convention that
∑0
t=1 v(t) = 0, and∏0
t=1 v(t) = 1. The supreme norm of a function f : D → R is
defined as ‖f‖sup = supx∈D |f(x)|, where D is a non-empty
set.
A. Setup
A two-player zero-sum asymmetric repeated game is spec-
ified by a five-tuple (K,A,B,M, p0), where
• K is a non-empty finite set, called the state set, the
elements of which are called states.
• A and B are non-empty finite sets, called player 1 and
2’s action sets, respectively.
• M : K × A × B → R is the one-stage payoff function
of player 1, or the one-stage penalty function of player
2. Mk indicates the payoff matrix given state k ∈ K .
The matrix element Mka,b, also denoted as M(k, a, b), is
the payoff given state k ∈ K , player 1’s action a ∈ A,
3and player 2’s action b ∈ B. The notation Mka,: indicates
the row vector payoff given state k and player 1’s action
a ∈ A.
• p0 ∈ ∆(K) is the initial probability on K . We assume
that pk0 > 0 for any k ∈ K .
A N -stage asymmetric repeated game is played as follows.
Let at, bt denote the actions of player 1 and player 2 for
stages t ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, respectively. At stage t = 1, a state
k is chosen once and for all according to the probability
distribution p0, and communicated to player 1 only. Player
1 and 2 are called the informed and the uninformed player,
respectively. Each player chooses his action independently, and
the pair (a1, b1) is observed by both players. At stage t = 2,
both players again simultaneously choose their actions, and
these are observable by both players. The payoff of player 1
and player 2 at stage t is Mkat,bt and −M
k
at,bt
, respectively.
Since the sum of two players’ payoffs is zero, this is a
zero-sum game. The process is repeated for the remaining
t = 2, 3, ..., N . These payoffs are not observed by player 2.
More formally, we will use the concept of behavior strate-
gies. For any stage t = 1, . . . , N , the histories of player 1 and
2’s actions prior to time t are denoted by hAt = {a1, . . . , at−1}
and hBt = {b1, . . . , bt−1}, respectively. For t = 1, the null
histories are denoted hA1 = h
B
1 = ∅. The corresponding set
of possible action sequences are denoted by HAt = A
t−1 and
HBt = B
t−1. A behavior strategy for player 1 is a collection
of mappings σ = (σt)
N
t=1, where each σt is a map from
K×HAt ×H
B
t to ∆(A). Similarly, but taking into account the
lack of information on the state k ∈ K , a behavior strategy for
player 2 is a collection of mappings τ = (τt)
N
t=1, where τt is a
map from HAt ×H
B
t to ∆(B). Denote by Σ and T the sets of
behavior strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. The values
σat (k, h
A
t , h
B
t ) for a ∈ A and τ
b
t (h
A
t , h
B
t ) for b ∈ B denote
the probabilities of playing a and b at stage t, respectively,
given the histories hAt ∈ H
A
t and h
B
t ∈ H
B
t , and realized
state, k ∈ K .
Play proceeds as follows. As previously stated, at stage
t = 1, a state k is chosen once and for all according to
the probability distribution p0. The action a1 is a random-
ized outcome according to the behavior strategy distribution
σ1(k, ∅, ∅) ∈ ∆(A), and the action b1 is a randomized outcome
according to the behavior strategy distribution τ1(∅, ∅). At
stage t = 2, ..., N , the action at is a randomized outcome
according to the behavior strategy distribution σt(k, h
A
t , h
B
t ) ∈
∆(A), and the action bt is a randomized outcome according
to the behavior strategy distribution τ1(h
A
t , h
B
t ), where we
assume that these outcomes are conditionally independent
given hAt and h
B
t .
A triple (p0, σ, τ) induces a probability distribution Pp0,σ,τ
on the set Ω = K× (A×B)N of plays. Let Ep0,σ,τ [·] denote
the corresponding expectation. The payoff with initial prob-
ability p0 and strategies σ and τ of the N -stage asymmetric
information repeated game is defined as
γN (p0, σ, τ) = Ep0,σ,τ
[
N∑
t=1
M(k, at, bt)
]
.
The N -stage game ΓT (p0) is defined as the two-player
zero-sum asymmetric repeated game equipped with initial
distribution p0, strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function
γN (p0, σ, τ). In game ΓN(p0), the informed player seeks to
maximize the payoff γN (p0, σ, τ), while the uninformed player
seeks to minimize it.
For the N -stage game ΓN (p0), the security level V N (p0)
of the informed player is defined as
V N (p0) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γN (p0, σ, τ),
and the strategy σ∗ ∈ Σ which achieves the security level is
called the security strategy of the informed player. Similarly,
the security level V N (p0) of the uninformed player is defined
as
V N (p0) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γN (p0, σ, τ),
and the strategy τ∗ ∈ T which achieves the security level is
called the security strategy of the uninformed player. When
V N (p0) = V N (p0), we say game ΓN(p0) has a value, i.e.
there exists a Nash equilibirum. Since the game ΓN (p0) is a
finite game, the game value always exists, and is denoted by
VN (p0) [14].
B. HB independent strategies
A fundamental difference between a repeated asymmetric
game and a one-shot asymmetric game is that in the re-
peated asymmetric game, the uninformed player can learn the
system state from the informed player’s actions. Indeed, the
uninformed player’s belief about the system state plays an
important role for both players to make decisions [6]. Since
only the informed player’s actions are directly related to the
system state, the uninformed player’s history action sequence
doesn’t provide extra information about the system state given
the informed player’s history action sequence. Therefore, it is
not surprised to see that given informed player’s history action
sequence, both players’ security strategies are independent of
the uninformed player’s history action sequence [14]. Let’s
define an HB independent behavior strategy of player 1 as
a collection of mappings σ¯ = (σ¯t)
N
t=1 where each σ¯t is a
map from K ×HAt to ∆(A). Similarly, an H
B independent
behavior strategy of player 2 is a collection of mappings
τ¯ = (τ¯t)
N
t=1 where τ¯t is a map from H
A
t to ∆(B). Denote
by Σ¯ and T¯ the sets of HB independent behavior strategies
of player 1 and 2. Clearly, Σ¯ and T¯ are subsets of Σ and T ,
respectively.
Proposition 1 ([19], [13], [14]). Consider a two-player zero-
sum N -stage asymmetric repeated game ΓN (p0). Each player
has a security strategy in game ΓN (p0) that is independent of
player 2’s history action sequence, i.e.
max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γN (p0, σ, τ) =max
σ¯∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γ(p0, σ¯, τ)
min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γN (p0, σ, τ) =min
τ¯∈T¯
max
σ∈Σ
γN (p0, σ, τ¯ ).
If one player’s behavior strategy is independent of the unin-
formed player’s history action sequence, then the other player’s
best response to the HB independent strategy is independent
of the uninformed player’s history action sequence, too.
4Proposition 2. Consider a two-player zero-sum N -stage
asymmetric repeated game ΓN (p0). For any σ¯ ∈ Σ¯, and any
τ¯ ∈ T¯ ,
min
τ∈T
γN (p0, σ¯, τ) =min
τ¯∈T¯
γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯) (1)
max
σ∈Σ
γN (p0, σ, τ¯ ) =max
σ¯∈Σ¯
γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯ ). (2)
Proof. Since T¯ ∈ T , we have minτ∈T γN (p0, σ¯, τ) ≤
minτ¯∈T¯ γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯ ). Meanwhile, for any τ ∈ T , we can
design τ¯btt (h
A
t ) =
∑
hBt ∈H
B
t
∏t
s=1 τ
bs
s (h
A
s , h
B
s ) for all t =
1, . . . , N, such that γN (p0, σ¯, τ) = γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯ ). Hence, we
have minτ∈T γN (p0, σ¯, τ) ≥ minτ¯∈T¯ γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯). There-
fore, equation (1) is shown.
Similarly, Σ¯ ∈ Σ implies that maxσ∈Σ γN (p0, σ, τ¯ ) ≥
maxσ¯∈Σ¯ γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯). Meanwhile, for any σ ∈ Σ, we can de-
sign σ¯att (k, h
A
t ) =
∑
hB
t
∈HB
t
∏
t
s=1 σ
as
s (k,h
A
s ,h
B
s )
∏t−1
s=1 τ¯
bs
s (h
A
s )
∑
hB
t−1
∈HB
t−1
∏t−1
s=1 σ
as
s (k,hAs ,h
B
s )
∏t−2
s=1 τ¯
bs
s (hAs )
for all t = 1, . . . , N , such that γN (p0, σ, τ¯ ) =
γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯), which implies that maxσ∈Σ γN (p0, σ, τ¯ ) ≤
maxσ¯∈Σ¯ γN (p0, σ¯, τ¯). Therefore, equation (2) is shown.
Proposition 1 and 2 imply that when computing players’
security strategies, we can ignore the uninformed player’s
history action sequence, which greatly reduces the number of
both players’ information sets in the extensive game tree, and
hence reduces the computational complexity of the security
strategies.
C. LP formulations of security strategies
A N -stage asymmetric information repeated game, as a
finite game, can always be expressed as a finite extensive game
tree[20]. Assuming perfect recall, i.e. each player can record
all history actions of both players, we can use sequence form
to construct a linear program to compute the security strat-
egy. Roughly speaking, in two-player zero-sum games, with
sequence form, the total payoffs at the leaf nodes of the game
tree are provided first, then the probability of the sequence
from the root node to the leaf node is characterized in the
form of every player’s realization plan, i.e. a player’s strategy
production, and finally an LP formulation can be derived to
compute the security strategies of two players based on an
LP’s dual problem. Moreover, the size of the linear program
is linear in the size of the game tree, and hence polynomial in
the size of the uninformed player’s action set [12]. In our case,
the analysis in subsection II-B indicates that both players can
ignore the uninformed player’s history action sequence when
making decisions. In other words, the uninformed player can
forget what he did before, which violates the perfect recall
assumption in the sequence form. Here, we will adopt the
realization plan in the sequence form, and take advantage of
the HB independent strategies to develop LP formulations
with reduced computational complexity to compute the HB
independent security strategies.
As in the sequence form, we define the realization plan
qt(h
A
t ; k) of the informed player’s history action sequence h
A
t
given state k at stage t as
qt(h
A
t ; k) =
t−1∏
s=1
σ¯ass (k, h
A
s ), (3)
where as and h
A
s are the informed player’s action and history
action sequence at stage s in the history action sequence hAt ,
denoted by as, h
A
s ∈ h
A
t . Therefore, the realization plan q
satisfy the following constraints:
q1(h
A
1 ; k) = 1, ∀k ∈ K, (4)∑
at∈A
qt+1((h
A
t , at); k) = qt(h
A
t ; k), ∀k ∈ K,h
A
t ∈ H
A
t ,
∀t = 1, . . . , N, (5)
qt(h
A
t ; k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,h
A
t ∈ H
A
t ,
∀t = 2, . . . , N + 1,
(6)
where (hAt , at) indicates concatenation. A realization plan of
the informed player is a collection of the informed player’s
realization plans q = (qt)
N+1
t=1 at all stages. Indeed, the real-
ization plan qt(h
A
t ; k) is the conditional probability P
[
hAt |k
]
.
The set of realization plans of the informed player is denoted
by Q, including all properly dimensioned real vectors satisfy-
ing equation (4-6).
A very important difference between a one-shot game and
a repeated game is that the uninformed player can learn the
system state from the informed player’s history actions. The
informed player can characterize his revelation of information
by the posterior probability P
[
k|hAt
]
, which is also called the
belief state of player 2. Let pt ∈ ∆(K) denote the posterior
probability over the system state k ∈ K at stage t given hAt ,
i.e. pkt (h
A
t ) = P
[
k|hAt
]
. The belief state pt+1 at stage t + 1
can be computed recursively as a function of pt, the informed
player’s strategy xkt = σ¯t(k, h
A
t ), and the informed player’s
realized action at based on the Bayesian law. Therefore, we
have
pkt+1(h
A
t+1) = π(pt, xt, at) =
pkt (h
A
t )x
k
t (at)
x¯pt,xt,(at)
, (7)
with p1 = p in game ΓN (p). Here, x
k
t (at) = σ
at
t (k, h
A
t ), and
x¯pt,xt(at) =
∑
k∈K p
k
t (h
A
t )x
k
t (at). The variable x¯ can be seen
as the weighted average of xt. Based on the belief state, the
value function VN (p) satisfies a backward recursive equation
which is similar to the Bellman’s equation [6], [14].
Vt(p) = max
x∈∆(A)|K|
min
y∈∆(B)
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky
+
∑
a1∈A
x¯p,x(a1)Vt−1(π(p, x, a1)). (8)
Based on the realization plan q and the backward recursive
formula (8), we construct a linear program to compute the
security strategy for the informed player.
5Theorem 3. Consider a two-player zero-sum N -stage asym-
metric repeated game ΓN(p). The game value VN (p) satisfies
VN (p) = max
q,ℓ∈Q,L
N∑
t=1
∑
hAt ∈H
A
t
ℓhAt (9)
s.t.
∑
k∈K,a∈A
pkqt+1((h
A
t , a); k)M
k
a,: ≥ ℓhAt 1
T ,
∀t = 1, · · · , N, ∀hAt ∈ H
A
t . (10)
where Q is a set including all properly dimensioned real
vectors satisfying (4-6), L is a properly dimensioned real
space, and (hAt , a) indicates concatenation. The informed
player’s security strategy σ¯∗ is
σ¯a∗t (k, h
A
t ) = q
∗
t+1((h
A
t , a); k)/q
∗
t (h
A
t ; k), ∀a ∈ A. (11)
Proof. By the duality theorem 1, it is easy to see that equation
(9-10) is true for N = 1. Let’s assume that Vt−1(p) satisfies
(9-10) for all t = 2, . . . . According to Lemma III.1 of [22],
we have x¯p,x(a1)Vt−1(π(p, x, a1)) = Vt−1(x¯p,xπ(p, x, a1)).
Therefore, the second term of (8) satisfies∑
a1∈A
x¯p,x(a1)Vt−1(π(p, x, a1))
=
∑
a1∈A
max
q,ℓa1∈Q,La1
t−1∑
s′=1
∑
hA
s′
∈HA
s′
ℓ(a1,hAs′)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
pkxk(a1)qs′+1((h
A
s′ , a); k) ≥ ℓ(a1,hAs′)
1
T ,
∀s′ = 1, . . . , t− 1, hAs′ ∈ H
A
s′ .
Let s = s′ + 1 and hAs = (a1, h
A
s′). we have∑
a1∈A
x¯p,x(a1)Vt−1(π(p, x, a1))
= max
q,ℓ∈Q,L
t∑
s=2
∑
hAs ∈H
A
s
ℓhAs
s.t.
∑
k∈K
pkqs+1((h
A
s , a); k) ≥ ℓhAs 1
T ,
∀s = 2, . . . , t, hAs ∈ H
A
s .
By the duality theorem, it is easy to verify that
min
y∈∆(B)
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky = max
ℓ
hA
1
∈R
ℓhAt
s.t.
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mk ≥ ℓhA1 1
T .
According to equation (8), and with the fact that xk(a1) =
q2(a1; k), we show that equation (9-10) still holds for Vt(p)
for t = 2, . . . .
Once we get the optimal solution q∗, according to (3),
the security strategy of the informed player can be computed
according to (11).
1Consider a primal LP problem and the corresponding dual LP problem.
If solutions to both problem exists, then optimal feasible solutions to both
problems exist, and the optimal values of the two problems are equal. [21]
Our LP formulation of informed player’s security strategy
has its size linear in the size of the state set and the size
of uninformed player’s action set, polynomial in the size of
informed player’s action set, and exponential in time horizon.
Let’s first analyze the variable size. Variable q consists of
(qt)
N+1
t=1 , where qt is of size |K| × |H
A
t | = |K| × |A
t−1|, and
hence q consists of |K|(1+|A|+· · ·+|A|N ) = O(|K||A|N+1)
scalars. Variable ℓ consists of (1 + |A| + · · · + |A|N−1) =
O(|A|N ) scalars. In all, we see that the LP formulation has
O(|K||A|N+1) scalar variables. Next, let’s take a look at the
constraint size. Constraint (4) includes |K| equations. Con-
straint (5) includes |K|(1+|A|+· · ·+|A|N−1) = O(|K||A|N )
equations. Constraint (6) includes |K|(1+ |A|+ · · ·+ |A|N ) =
O(|K||A|N+1) equations. Constraint (10) includes |B|(1 +
|A|+ · · ·+ |A|N−1) = O(|B||A|N ) equations. In all, there are
O((|K|+|B|)|A|N+1) equations. Therefore, the size of the LP
formulation to compute the informed player’s security strategy
is linear in |K| and |B|, polynomial in |A|, and exponential
in N .
Next, let’s take a look at the uninformed player’s secu-
rity strategy. Define the conditional expected total payoff
u(τ¯ ; k, hAN+1) given uninformed player’s strategy τ¯ ∈ T¯ ,
state k ∈ K , and informed player’s history action sequence
hAN+1 ∈ H
A
N+1 as
u(τ¯ ; k, hAN+1) = Eτ¯
[
N∑
t=1
M(k, at, bt)|k, h
A
N+1
]
. (12)
It is easy to show that
u(τ¯ ; k, hAN+1) =
N∑
t=1
Mkat,:yhAt , (13)
where yhAt = τ¯t(h
A
t ), and at, h
A
t ∈ h
A
N+1. We notice that
u(τ¯ ; k, hAN+1) is a linear function of τ¯ , or in other words, y.
Theorem 4. Consider a two-player zero-sum N -stage asym-
metric repeated game ΓN (p). The game value VN (p) satisfies
VN (p) = min
y∈Y,ℓ∈R|K|
pT ℓ (14)
s.t. u(y; k, :) ≤ ℓk1, ∀k ∈ K, (15)
1
T yhAt = 1, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t , ∀t = 1, . . . , N,
(16)
yhAt ≥ 0, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t , ∀t = 1, . . . , N.
(17)
where Y is a properly dimensioned real space, and u(y; k, :
) is a |HAN+1| dimensional column vector whose element is
u(y; k, hAN+1), a linear function of y satisfying equation (13).
The uninformed player’s security strategy τ¯∗(hAt ) is y
∗(hAt ).
Proof. Let’s define νkN (τ¯ ) =
maxσ¯(k)∈Σ¯(k)Eσ¯,τ¯
[∑N
t=1M
k
at,bt
|k
]
, where σ¯(k) indicates
the informed player’s HB independent behavior strategy
6given the system state k ∈ K and Σ¯(k) is the corresponding
set including all possible σ¯(k). We have
νkN (τ¯ ) = max
σ¯(k)∈Σ¯(k)
∑
hA
N+1∈H
A
N+1
P
[
hAN+1|k
]
u(τ¯ ; k, hAN+1)
= max
qN+1(:,k)∈∆(HAN+1)
∑
hA
N+1∈H
A
N+1
qN+1(hN+1; k)u(τ¯ ; k, h
A
N+1).
According to the duality theorem, we have
νkN (τ¯ ) = min
ℓk∈R
ℓk (18)
s.t. u(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓk1. (19)
The game value VN (p) satisfies
VN (p) =min
τ¯∈T¯
∑
k∈K
pkµkN (τ¯ )
= min
y∈Y,ℓ∈R|K|
∑
k∈K
pkℓk
s.t.u(y; k, :) ≤ 1ℓk, ∀k ∈ K.
The LP formulation of the uninformed player’s security
strategy has its size linear in the size of the state set and his
own action set, polynomial in the size of the informed player’s
action set, and exponential in time horizon. We first analyze
the variable size. Variable y includes (yt)
N
t=1, where yt is of
size |B||At−1|, and hence y has |B|(1+ |A|+ · · ·+ |A|N−1) =
O(|B||A|N ) scalar variables. Variable ℓ is of size |K|. In
all, the variable size is in the order of |B||A|N + |K|. We
then study the constraint size. Constraint (16) consists of
(1 + |A| + · · · + |A|N−1) = O(|A|N ) equations. Constraint
(17) consists of |B|(1 + |A| + · · · + |A|N−1) = O(|B||A|N )
equations. Constraint (15) consists of |A|N |K| equations. In
all, the constraint size is of order O((|B| + |K| + 1)|A|N ).
Therefore, the size of the LP formulation to compute the
uninformed player’s security strategy is linear in |K| and |B|,
polynomial in |A|, and exponential in N .
III. λ-DISCOUNTED ASYMMETRIC REPEATED GAMES
In finite-stage asymmetric information repeated games, the
security strategies of the players depend on the informed
player’s history actions. As the time horizon gets long, players
need a large amount of memory to record the history actions.
Since the horizon of a λ-discounted asymmetric repeated
game is infinite, it is necessary for players to find fixed-sized
sufficient statistics for decision making. After figuring out the
fixed-sized sufficient statistics, we find that players’ security
strategies in λ-discounted asymmetric repeated game are still
hard to compute, and hence approximated security strategies
with guaranteed performance are provided. This section talks
about the sufficient statistics and the approximated security
strategies player by player.
A. Setup
A two-player zero-sum λ-discounted asymmetric repeated
game is specified by the same five-tuple (K,A,B,M, p0) and
played in the same way as described in the two-player zero-
sum N -stage asymmetric repeated game. The payoff of player
1 at stage t is λ(1−λ)t−1M(k, at, bt) for some λ ∈ (0, 1), and
the game is played for infinite horizon. The payoff of the λ-
discounted asymmetric repeated game with initial probability
p0 and strategies σ and τ is defined as
γλ(p0, σ, τ) = Ep0,σ,τ
(
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, at, bt)
)
.
The λ-discounted game Γλ(p0) is defined as a two-player
zero-sum asymmetric repeated game equipped with initial
distribution p0, strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function
γλ(p0, σ, τ). The security strategies σ
∗ and τ∗, and security
levels V λ(p0) and V λ(p0) are defined in the same way as in
N -stage game in Section II for player 1 and 2, respectively.
Since γλ(p0, σ, τ) is bilinear over σ and τ , Γλ(p0) has a
value Vλ(p0) according to Sion’s minimax Theorem, i.e.
Vλ(p0) = V λ(p0) = V λ(p0) [14].
B. The informed player
1) The informed player’s security strategy: The belief state
pt in (7) plays an important role in decision making of
the informed player. Indeed, in a λ-discounted asymmetric
repeated game Γλ(p), the belief state pt is sufficient statistics
of the informed player.
Proposition 5 ([14]). Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-
discounted asymmetric repeated game Γλ(p). The game value
Vλ(p) satisfies
Vλ(p) = max
x∈∆(A)|K|
min
y∈∆(B)(
λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky + (1− λ)Tp,x(Vλ)
)
, (20)
where
Tp,x(Vλ) =
∑
a∈A
x¯ap,xVλ(π(p, x, a)). (21)
Moreover, the informed player has a security strategy that
depends only on the belief state pt at each stage t, and is in-
dependent of the uninformed player’s history action sequence.
First of all, Proposition 5 points out that the informed
player’s security strategy is independent of the uninformed
player’s history action, just as what it is in N -stage game.
Following the same steps, we can show that the uninformed
player’s best response to an HB independent strategy is also
HB independent. Second, Proposition 5 provides the sufficient
statistics pt of the informed player. So the informed player
only needs to record pt ∈ ∆(K) instead of all of his own
history actions. Finally, given the belief state pt, Proposition
5 gives a Bellman-like equation (20) to compute the informed
player’s security strategy.
Unfortunately, computing the value Vλ(p) and the informed
player’s corresponding security strategy σ∗ is non-convex [15],
7[16]. Therefore, we need to find an approximated security
strategy that is easy to compute, and has some performance
guarantee.
2) The informed player’s approximated security strategy:
One way to approximate the security strategy is to approximate
the game value Vλ(p) first, and then compute the security
strategy based on the approximated game value. Here, we
will use the game value Vλ,N (p) of a λ-discounted N -stage
asymmetric repeated game Γλ,N (p) to approximate the game
value Vλ(p).
A λ-discounted N -stage repeated asymmetric game
Γλ,N (p0) is a truncated version of a λ-discounted asymmetric
repeated game Γλ(p0) with time horizon N . To be more
specific, a λ-discounted N -stage asymmetric repeated game
Γλ,N (p0) is specified by the same five-tuple (K,A,B,M, p0)
and played in the same way as in a λ-discounted asymmetric
repeated game Γλ(p0). The one-stage payoff is the same
as in Γλ(p0), i.e. λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, at, bt). The only differ-
ence between a λ-discounted N -stage repeated asymmetric
game Γλ,N(p0) and a λ-discounted repeated asymmetric game
Γλ(p0) is that the game is played for N stages in Γλ,N (p0),
and infinite stages in Γλ(p0). Therefore, the payoff of game
Γλ,N (p0) is
γλ,N (p0, σ, τ) = Ep0,σ,τ
(
N∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, at, bt)
)
.
A λ-discounted N -stage repeated asymmetric game Γλ,N (p0)
is defined as a two-player zero-sum repeated asymmetric game
equipped with initial probability p0, strategy spaces Σ and T ,
and payoff function γλ,N (p0, σ, τ).
Following the standard arguments as in the proof of Propo-
sition 5, we see that the game value Vλ,N+1(p) of the λ-
discounted N -stage game Γλ,N+1(p) satisfies the recursive
formula as below.
Vλ,N+1(p) = max
x∈∆(A)|K|
min
y∈∆(B)
(
λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky
+(1− λ)Tp,x(Vλ,N )) , (22)
with Vλ,0(p) ≡ 0.
Before we go ahead to provide the approximated security
strategy based on this approximated game value, we are
interested in how good the approximated game value is, and
how fast it converges to the real game value. To this purpose,
we define an operator Fx as
F
V
x (p) = min
y∈∆(B)
{λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky + (1− λ)Tp,x(V )}.
(23)
It’s clear that Vλ(p) = maxx∈∆(A)|K| F
Vλ
x (p), and
Vλ,N+1(p) = maxx∈∆(A)|K| F
Vλ,N
x (p). The operator Fx is
actually a contraction mapping.
Lemma 6. Let V be the set of functions mapping from ∆(K)
to R. Given any x ∈ ∆(A)|K| and λ ∈ (0, 1), the operator
Fx : V → V defined in (23) is a contraction mapping with
contraction constant 1− λ, i.e.
‖FV1x − F
V2
x ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V1 − V2‖sup, ∀V1, V2 ∈ V .
Proof. Since the second term of mapping Fx in equation (23)
is irrelevant to y, we have
F
V1
x (p) = min
y∈∆(B)
{λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky}+ (1− λ)Tp,x(V1),
F
V2
x (p) = min
y∈∆(B)
{λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky}+ (1− λ)Tp,x(V2).
Therefore, according to the definition of T in (21),
|FV1x (p)− F
V2
x (p)|
≤(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,x(a)|V1(π(a; p, x))− V2(π(a; p, x))|.
Its supreme norm, hence, satisfies
‖FV1x − F
V2
x ‖sup
≤ sup
p∈∆(K)
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,x(a)|V1(π(a; p, x))− V2(π(a; p, x))|
≤(1− λ)‖V1 − V2‖sup sup
p∈∆(K)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,x(a)
=(1− λ)‖V1 − V2‖sup
Lemma 6 further implies that the approximated game value
Vλ,N converges to the real game value Vλ exponentially fast
with respect to N , which is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), the approximated game value
Vλ,N+1 converges to Vλ exponentially fast with rate 1−λ, i.e.
‖Vλ − Vλ,N+1‖sup ≤(1− λ)‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup (24)
≤(1− λ)N+1‖Vλ‖sup. (25)
Proof. From equation (20) and (22), we have
|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N+1(p)|
=| max
x∈∆(A)|K|
F
Vλ
x (p)− max
x∈∆(A)|K|
F
Vλ,N
x (p)|.
Let x∗ and x⋆ be the solution to maxx∈∆(A)|K| F
Vλ
x (p) and
maxx∈∆(A)|K| F
Vλ,N
x (p), respectively.
Given p ∈ ∆(K), if Vλ(p) ≥ Vλ,N+1(p), we have
|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N+1(p)| ≤ |F
Vλ
x∗ (p)− F
Vλ,N
x∗ (p)|
≤ (1− λ)‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup.
Given p ∈ ∆(K), if Vλ(p) ≤ Vλ,N+1(p), we have
|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N+1(p)| ≤ |F
Vλ
x⋆ (p)− F
Vλ,N
x⋆ (p)|
≤ (1− λ)‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup.
Therefore, we have for any p ∈ ∆(K), |Vλ(p) −
Vλ,N+1(p)| ≤ (1 − λ)‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup, which further implies
equation (24) and (25).
In λ-discounted game Γλ(p), σ¯λ,N : K ×∆(K) → ∆(A)
indicates the informed player’s stationary strategy that is
8computed based on the approximated game value Vλ,N , and
satisfies the following formula.
σ¯λ,N (:, p) = argmax
x∈∆(A)|K|
min
y∈∆(B)
(
λ
∑
k∈K
pkxk
T
Mky
+(1− λ)Tp,x(Vλ,N )) , (26)
where σ¯λ,N (:, p) is a |A| × |K| matrix whose kth column is
σ¯λ,N (k, p). Clearly, σ¯λ,N (:, p) can be also seen as player 1’s
security strategy at stage 1 in the λ-discounted N + 1-stage
asymmetric repeated game Γλ,N+1(p). Following the same
steps as in Theorem 3, we can construct a linear program
to compute the approximated game value Vλ,N+1(p) and the
corresponding approximated security strategy σ¯λ,N (k, p).
Theorem 8. Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted
asymmetric game Γλ(p). The approximated game value
Vλ,N+1(p) satisfies
Vλ,N+1(p) = max
q,ℓ∈Q,L
N+1∑
t=1
∑
hAt ∈H
A
t
λ(1 − λ)t−1ℓhAt (27)
s.t.
∑
k∈K,a∈A
qt+1(k, (h
A
t , a))M
k
a,: ≥ ℓhAt 1
T ,
∀t = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1, hAt ∈ H
A
t , (28)
where q ∈ Q is a set including all properly dimensioned
real vectors satisfying (4-6), L is a properly dimensioned
real space, and (hAt , at) corresponds to concatenation. The
approximated security strategy
σ¯aλ,N (k, p) = q
∗
2(a; k), ∀a ∈ A. (29)
3) The performance analysis of the informed player’s ap-
proximated security strategy: Now that we can compute the
informed player’s approximated security strategy, the next
question is which performance this strategy can guarantee.
To this purpose, we first define the security level J σ¯λ,N (p)
guaranteed by the approximated security strategy σ¯λ,N as
J σ¯λ,N (p) = min
τ¯∈T¯
γλ(p, σ¯λ,N , τ¯ ). (30)
Since σ¯λ,N is a stationary strategy, according to the standard
procedure of dynamic programming, its security level J σ¯λ,N
has the following property.
Lemma 9. Let σ¯ ∈ Σ¯ be the informed player’s stationary
strategy that depends only on the belief state pt besides the
state k ∈ K . The security level J σ¯ of σ¯ satisfies J σ¯(p) =
F
J σ¯
σ¯(:,p)(p).
Proof. Since player 1’s strategy is fixed to be σ¯, the discounted
game Γλ becomes a discounted optimization problem, and
hence satisfies Bellman’s principle, i.e.
J σ¯(p) = min
y∈∆(B)
(
λ
∑
k∈K
pkσ¯(k, p)TMky
+(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,σ¯(:,p)(a)J
σ¯(π(p, σ¯(:, p), a))
)
= min
y∈∆(B)
(
λ
∑
k∈K
pkσ¯(k, p)
T
Mky
+(1− λ)Tp,σ¯(:,p)(J
σ¯)
)
=FJ
σ¯
σ¯(:,p)(p).
Now, we are ready to show that the difference between the
approximated security strategy’s security level J σ¯λ,N and the
game value is bounded from above, which is stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 10. The security level J σ¯λ,N of the informed
player’s approximated security strategy σ¯λ,N defined in equa-
tion (26) converges to the game value exponentially fast in N
with rate 1− λ. To be more specific,
‖Vλ − J
σ¯λ,N ‖sup ≤
2(1− λ)
λ
‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup. (31)
≤(1− λ)N+1
2‖Vλ‖sup
λ
. (32)
Proof. Lemma 9 indicates that
|Vλ(p)− J
σ¯λ,N (p)|
≤|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N+1(p)|+ |Vλ,N+1(p)− J
σ¯λ,N (p)|
=|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N+1(p)|+ |F
Vλ,N
σ¯λ,N (:,p)
(p)− FJ
σ¯λ,N
σ¯λ,N (:,p)
(p)|.
Take the supreme norm on both sides, and use Lemma 6 and
Theorem 7. We have
‖Vλ − J
σ¯λ,N ‖sup
≤(1− λ)
(
‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup + ‖Vλ,N − J
σ¯λ,N ‖sup
)
≤(1− λ) (‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup + ‖Vλ,N − Vλ‖sup
+‖Vλ − J
σ¯λ,N ‖sup
)
,
which implies equation (31). Together with Theorem 7, equa-
tion (32) is shown.
Notice that as N goes to infinity, the difference between the
game value and the security level of the approximated security
strategy σ¯λ,N goes to 0.
We would like to provide an algorithm to conclude this
subsection about the informed player’s approximated security
strategy.
Algorithm 11. The informed player’s algorithm in λ-
discounted asymmetric repeated game
(i) Initialization
• Read payoff matrices M , initial probability p0, and
system state k.
• Set N .
• Let t = 1, and p1 = p0.
9(ii) Compute the informed player’s approximated security
strategy σ¯λ,N based on (29) where q
∗
2 is the optimal
solution of LP (27-28) with p = pt.
(iii) Choose an action a ∈ A according to the probability
σ¯λ,N (k, pt), and announce it publicly.
(iv) Update the belief state pt+1 according to (7).
(v) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step (ii).
C. The uninformed player
Because of the lack of access to the informed player’s
strategy, the belief state pt is not available to the uninformed
player, and hence can not serve as the uninformed player’s
sufficient statistics. De Meyer first introduced the dual game
of an asymmetric repeated game in [13], and pointed out that
the uninformed player’s security strategy in the dual game with
a special initial regret is also the uninformed player’s security
strategy in the ‘primal’ game. One applaudable property of the
uninformed player’s security strategy in the dual game is that
the security strategy depends only on a fixed-sized sufficient
statistics that is fully available to the uninformed player. The
questions are what is the ‘special’ initial regret, and how to
compute the corresponding security strategy in the dual game.
To answer these questions, we first introduce the dual game
of an asymmetric repeated game.
1) The uninformed player’s security strategy and the dual
game: Given a λ-discounted asymmetric repeated game
Γλ(p), which is also called the primal game hereafter, its dual
game Γ˜λ(w) is defined with respect to p, where w ∈ R|K|
is called the initial regret. The dual game is played the same
way as in the primal game, except that the system state k ∈ K
is chosen by player 1 (informed player) instead of the nature.
In the dual game, Player 2 (uninformed player) is still not
informed of the system state. Let p be player 1’s strategy to
choose the system state, player 1’s payoff or player 2’s penalty
in the dual game Γ˜λ(w) is defined as
γ˜λ(w, p, σ, τ) = Ep,σ,τ
[
wk +
∞∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1M(k, at, bt)
]
.
(33)
The λ-discounted asymmetric repeated dual game Γ˜λ(w)
has a game value denoted by V˜λ(w) satisfying [13]
V˜λ(w) = min
τ∈T
max
p∈∆(K),σ∈Σ
γ˜λ(w, p, σ, τ)
= max
p∈∆(K),σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γ˜λ(w, p, σ, τ). (34)
The game value of the dual game and the game value of the
primal game are related in the following way [13], [14].
V˜λ(w) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ(p) + p
Tw}, (35)
Vλ(p) = min
w∈R|K|
{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw}. (36)
It was shown that the security strategies of the uninformed
player in both the primal and the dual games depend only on
the informed player’s history actions [13], [14]. Following the
same steps as in Proposition 2, we can show that the informed
player’s best responses to an HB independent strategy in both
the primal and the dual games are also HB independent.
Therefore, we only consider HB independent strategies for
both players in the rest of this subsection.
Let’s define the anti-discounted regret wkt at stage t with
respect to state k given informed player’s history action
sequence hAt as
wkt (h
A
t ) =
Eτ¯
[
wk +
∑t−1
s=1 λ(1− λ)
s−1Mkas,bs |k, h
A
t
]
(1− λ)t−1
, ∀k ∈ K.
The anti-discounted regret wkt (h
A
t ) can be computed recur-
sively as
wkt+1((h
A
t , at)) =
wkt (h
A
t ) + λM
k
at,:τ¯(h
A
t )
1− λ
, ∀k ∈ K, (37)
with w1 = w. The anti-discounted regret wt is indeed the
sufficient statistics for the uninformed player in the dual game.
Proposition 12. [13], [14] The value V˜λ(w) of the λ-
discounted dual asymmetric repeated game Γ˜λ(w) satisfies
V˜λ(w) = min
y∈∆(B)
max
a∈A
(1 − λ)V˜λ
(
w + λMay
1− λ
)
, (38)
where Ma is a |K| × |B| matrix whose kth row is Mka,:.
Moreover, the uninformed player has a security strategy that
depends only at each stage t on wt.
Meanwhile, it was also shown in [13], [14] that the security
strategy of the uninformed player in the dual game Γ˜λ(w
∗)
with some special initial regret w∗ is also the security strategy
for the uninformed player in the primal game Γλ(p).
Proposition 13. (Corollary 2.10 and 3.25 in [14]) Consider
a λ-discounted asymmetric repeated game Γλ(p) and its dual
game Γ˜λ(w). Let w
∗ be the optimal solution to the optimal
problem on the right hand side of equation (36). The security
strategy for the uninformed player in the dual game Γ˜λ(w
∗)
is also the security strategy for the uninformed player in the
primal game Γλ(p).
Proposition 13 indicates that given an initial probability in
the primal game, there exists an initial regret in the dual game
such that the security strategies of the uninformed player in
the primal and the dual games are the same. Therefore, when
playing the primal game Γλ(p), the uninformed player can
find out the corresponding initial regret w∗ in the dual game
first, and then play the dual game instead.
2) The special initial regret w∗ and its approximation:
The next question is what the special initial regret w∗ is.
Mathematically speaking, w∗ is the optimal solution to the
problemminw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w)−p
Tw}. We are also curious about
the physical meaning of w∗, i.e. what exactly w∗ stands for in
the primal game Γλ(p). To this purpose, let’s first define the
uninformed player’s worst case regret µλ ∈ R|K| of strategy
τ¯ ∈ T¯ in the primal game as
µkλ(τ) = − max
σ¯(k)∈Σ¯(k)
Ep,σ¯,τ¯
[
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1Mkat,bt |k
]
,
(39)
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where σ¯(k) indicates informed player’s HB independent be-
havior strategy if the system state is k ∈ K , and Σ¯(k) is the
corresponding set including all σ(k).
The special initial regret w∗ is actually the uninformed
player’s worst case regret of his security strategy.
Theorem 14. Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted
asymmetric repeated game Γλ(p). Let τ
∗ be the uninformed
player’s security strategy in Γλ(p). An optimal solution w
∗
to the optimal problem minw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw} is w∗ =
µλ(τ
∗), i.e.
min
w∈R|K|
{V˜λ(w)− p
Tw} = V˜λ(µλ(τ
∗))− pTµλ(τ
∗). (40)
Proof. Equation (36) shows that the left hand side of (40)
equals to Vλ(p). We will show that the right hand side of (40)
equals to Vλ(p), too.
First, we have
Vλ(p) = max
σ∈Σ
γλ(p, σ, τ
∗) = −pTµλ(τ
∗). (41)
Next, we show that
V˜λ(µλ(τ
∗)) = 0. (42)
Equation (35) implies that V˜λ(µλ(τ
∗)) ≥ Vλ(p) +
pTµλ(τ
∗) = 0. Meanwhile, for any p′ ∈ ∆(K), we have
Vλ(p
′) =min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γλ(p
′, σ, τ)
≤max
σ∈Σ
γλ(p, σ, τ
∗) = −pTµλ(τ
∗). (43)
Notice here that τ∗ is the uninformed player’s security strategy
in Γλ(p), and is not necessarily the uninformed player’s
security strategy in Γλ(p
′). Equation (43) implies that Vλ(p)+
pTµλ(τ
∗) ≤ 0. Therefore, equation (42) is true. Together with
(41), we show that the right hand side of (40) equals to Vλ(p),
which completes the proof.
The uninformed player’s worst case regret w∗ of this
security strategy can be seen as the dual variable of the initial
probability p. The production of the two variables recovers
the opposite of the game value (see equation (41). While the
informed player’s security strategy depends only on p and its
Bayesian update pt, the uninformed player can fully rely on
w∗ and its anti-discounted update wt to generate his security
strategy. Moreover, the belief state pt is fully available to the
informed player, while the anti-discounted regret wt is fully
available to the uninformed player.
Theorem 14 characterizes the physical meaning of the
special initial regret w∗. The next question is how to com-
pute it. Unfortunately, computing w∗ is difficult, since it
relies on the security strategy for the uninformed player
and the game value in the primal game, which is non-
convex [16]. Therefore, we propose to approximate w∗ based
on the λ-discounted N -stage asymmetric repeated game
Γλ,N (p), a truncated version of the primal game Γλ(p).
Let τ¯⋆ ∈ T¯ be the security strategy for the uninformed
player in Γλ,N (p). The approximation w
⋆ of the special
initial regret is µλ,N (τ¯
⋆) which is defined as µkλ,N (τ¯
⋆) =
−maxσ¯(k)∈Σ¯(k) Ep,σ¯,τ¯⋆
[∑N
t=1 λ(1− λ)
t−1Mkat,bt |k
]
.
Similarly to the N -stage game, in the λ-discounted N -
stage game, we define the conditional expected total payoff
uλ(τ¯ ; k, h
A
N+1) given uninformed player’s strategy τ¯ ∈ T¯ ,
state k ∈ K and informed player’s history action sequence
hAN+1 ∈ H
A
N+1 as
uλ,N(τ¯ ; k, h
A
N+1) = Eτ¯
[
N∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1Mkat,bt |k, h
A
N+1
]
,
(44)
which satisfies
uλ,N(τ¯ ; k, h
A
N+1) =
N∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1Mkat,:yhAt . (45)
Following the same steps as in Theorem 4, we can construct
an LP formulation to compute Vλ,N (p) and µλ,N (τ¯
⋆).
Theorem 15. Consider a λ-discounted asymmetric repeated
game Γλ(p). The approximated game value Vλ,N (p) satisfies
Vλ,N (p) = min
y∈Y,ℓ∈R|K|
∑
k∈K
pkℓk (46)
s.t. uλ,N(y; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K, (47)
1
T yhAt = 1, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t , ∀t = 1, . . . , N,
(48)
yhAt ≥ 0, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t , ∀t = 1, . . . , N,
(49)
where Y is a properly dimensioned real space, and uλ(y; k, :
) is a |HAN+1| dimensional column vector whose element is
uλ(y; k, h
A
N+1), a linear function of y satisfying equation (45).
The approximated regret w⋆ is −ℓ∗.
3) The Uninformed player’s approximated security strat-
egy: Now that the approximated initial regret w⋆ for the dual
game Γ˜λ(w
⋆) is computed, the next step is to compute the
uninformed player’s security strategy in the dual game, which
is again non-convex [16]. Similar to what we do in approx-
imating the informed player’s security strategy, we use the
game value of a λ-discounted N -stage dual game Γ˜λ,N (w
⋆)
to approximate V˜λ(w
⋆), and derive the uninformed player’s
approximated security strategy based on the approximated
game value.
A λ-discounted N -stage asymmetric repeated dual game
Γ˜λ,N (w) is played the same way as a λ-discounted asymmetric
repeated dual game Γ˜λ(w) except that Γ˜λ,N (w) is only played
for N -stages. Since Γ˜λ,N (w) is a finite game, it has a value
denoted by V˜λ,N (w), i.e.
V˜λ,N (w) (50)
=min
τ¯∈T¯
max
p∈∆(K),σ¯∈Σ¯
Ep,σ¯,τ¯
[
w +
T∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1Mkat,bt
]
(51)
= max
p∈∆(K),σ¯∈Σ¯
min
τ¯∈T¯
Ep,σ¯,τ¯
[
w +
N∑
t=1
λ(1 − λ)t−1Mkat,bt
]
(52)
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Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.23 in
[14], we derive that the game value V˜λ,N+1(w) of dual game
Γ˜λ,N+1(w) satisfies the following recursive formula.
V˜λ,N+1(w) = min
y∈∆(B)
max
a∈A
(1− λ)V˜λ,N
(
w + λMay
1− λ
)
,
(53)
with V˜λ,0(w) = maxk∈K w
k. Moreover, since Γ˜λ,N (w) is a
dual game of Γλ,N(p), their game values have the following
relations.
V˜λ,N (w) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Vλ,N (p) + p
Tw}, (54)
Vλ,N (p) = min
w∈R|K|
{V˜λ,N (w)− p
Tw}. (55)
Based on the relations between the game values of the λ-
discounted game Γλ(p), the λ-discounted N -stage games
Γλ,N (p) and their dual games, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted
asymmetric repeated game Γλ(p) and its dual game Γ˜λ(w),
and a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted N -stage asymmetric
repeated game Γλ,N (p) and its dual game Γ˜λ,N (w). Their
game values satisfy
‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup = ‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N‖sup. (56)
Proof. First, we show ‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup ≤ ‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N‖sup.
According to equation (36) and (55), we have
|Vλ(p)− Vλ,N (p)|
=| min
w∈R|K|
{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw} − min
w∈R|K|
{V˜λ,N (w) − p
Tw}|.
Let w∗ and w⋆ be the optimal solution to the prob-
lem minw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw} and minw∈R|K|{V˜λ,N (w) −
pTw}, respectively. If minw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw} ≥
minw∈R|K|{V˜λ,N (w) − p
Tw}, then we have |Vλ(p) −
Vλ,N (p)| ≤ |V˜λ(w⋆) − V˜λ,N (w⋆)|. Otherwise, we have
|Vλ(p) − Vλ,N (p)| ≤ |V˜λ(w∗) − V˜λ,N (w∗)|. Therefore, for
any p ∈ ∆(K), |Vλ(p)− Vλ,N (p)| ≤ ‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N‖sup, which
implies that ‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup ≤ ‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N‖sup.
Following the same steps, based on equation (35) and (54),
we derive that ‖V˜λ− V˜λ,N‖sup ≤ ‖Vλ−Vλ,N‖sup. Therefore,
equation (56) is shown.
Before we draw the uninformed player’s approximated secu-
rity strategy based on the approximated game value V˜λ,N (w
⋆),
we are interested in how far away the approximated game
value is from the real game value. To this purpose, we define
an operator F˜y as
F˜
V˜
y (w) = (1 − λ)max
a∈A
V˜
(
w + λMay
1− λ
)
, (57)
where y ∈ ∆(B), w ∈ R|K|, and V˜ : R|K| → R. With the
same technique as in Lemma 6, we can show that F˜ is also a
contraction mapping.
Lemma 17. Given any y ∈ ∆(B) and λ ∈ (0, 1), the
operator F˜y defined as in (57) is a contraction mapping with
contraction constant 1− λ, i.e.
‖F˜V˜1y − F˜
V˜2
y ‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜1 − V˜2‖sup, (58)
where V˜1,2 : R
|K| → R.
Lemma 17 further implies that the approximated value V˜λ,N
converges to the real game value V˜λ exponentially fast with
respect to N . The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.
Theorem 18. Consider the game value V˜λ(w) of a λ-
discounted asymmetric repeated dual game Γ˜λ(w) and the
game value V˜λ,N (w) of a λ-discounted N -stage asymmetric
repeated dual game Γ˜λ,N (w). The game value V˜λ,N converges
to V˜λ exponentially fast with respect to the time horizon N
with convergence rate 1− λ, i.e.
‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N+1‖sup ≤ (1− λ)‖V˜λ − V˜λ,N‖sup. (59)
Applying the approximated game value V˜λ,N in equation
(38), we derive the uninformed player’s approximated security
strategy τ¯λ,N (wt) in dual game Γ˜λ(w
⋆) as
τ¯λ,N (wt) = argmin
y∈∆(B)
max
a∈A
(1− λ)V˜λ,N
(
wt + λMay
1− λ
)
,
(60)
where wt is updated according to (37). Comparing equation
(60) and (53), we see that the approximated security strategy
τ¯λ,N (wt) can be seen as the uninformed player’s security
strategy at stage 1 in a λ-discounted N + 1-stage dual game
Γ˜λ,N+1(wt). Similar to the LP formulation computing the
game value of Γλ,N (p), we construct an LP formulation to
compute the game value of Γ˜λ,N+1(w) and the uninformed
player’s approximated security strategy τ¯λ,N .
Theorem 19. Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted
N+1-stage dual game Γ˜λ,N+1(w). Its game value V˜λ,N+1(w)
satisfies
V˜λ,N+1(w) = min
y∈Y,ℓ∈R|K|,L∈R
L (61)
s.t.w + ℓ ≤ L1 (62)
uλ,N+1(y; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K, (63)
1
T yhAt = 1, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t ,
∀t = 1, . . . , N + 1,
(64)
yhAt ≥ 0, ∀h
A
t ∈ H
A
t ,
∀t = 1, . . . , N + 1,
(65)
where Y is a properly dimensioned real space, and
uλ,N+1(y; k, :) is a |HAN+2| dimensional column vector whose
element is uλ,N+1(y; k, h
A
N+2), a linear function of y satisfy-
ing equation (45).
Moreover, suppose in dual game Γ˜λ(w0), at stage t, the
anti-discounted regret wt = w. The uninformed player’s
approximated security strategy τ¯λ,N (w) is y
∗
hA1
.
Proof. According to equation (52), we have
V˜λ,N+1(w) = min
τ¯∈T¯
max
p∈∆(K)
∑
k∈K
pk(wk − µλ,N+1(τ¯ )).
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Similar to how we derive equation (18), we have
−µkλ,N+1(τ¯ ) = min
ℓk∈R
ℓk
s.t.uλ,N+1(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1.
Therefore, we have
V˜λ,N+1(w) =min
τ¯∈T¯
max
p∈∆(K)
min
ℓ∈R|K|
∑
k∈K
pk(wk + ℓk)
s.t.uλ,N+1(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K.
Since
∑
k∈K p
k(wk + ℓk) is bilinear in p and ℓ, according to
Sion’s minimax theorem, we have
V˜λ,N+1(w) =min
τ¯∈T¯
min
ℓ∈R|K|
max
p∈∆(K)
∑
k∈K
pk(wk + ℓk)
s.t.uλ,N+1(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K.
According to the duality theorem, given any τ¯ ∈ T¯ and ℓ ∈
R
|K|, we have
max
p∈∆(K)
∑
k∈K
pk(wk + ℓk)
s.t.uλ,N+1(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K
=min
L∈R
L
s.t.w + ℓ ≤ L1,
uλ,N+1(τ¯ ; k, :) ≤ ℓ
k
1, ∀k ∈ K,
which completes the proof.
Now, we know how to compute the approximated special
initial regret w⋆ and the uninformed player’s approximated
security strategy τ¯λ,N in the dual game Γ˜λ(w
⋆). This ap-
proximated security strategy τ¯λ,N is also the uninformed
player’s approximated security strategy in the primal game
Γλ(p). Let’s conclude this subsection with the uninformed
player’s algorithm in the λ-discounted asymmetric repeated
game Γλ(p).
Algorithm 20. The uninformed player’s approximated se-
curity strategy in λ-discounted asymmetric repeated game
Γλ(p0)
(i) Initialization
• Read payoff matrices M and initial probability p0.
• Set N .
• Solve the LP problem (47-48) with p = p0, and let
w⋆ = −ℓ∗.
• Let t = 1 and w1 = w
⋆.
(ii) Solve the LP problem (61-65) with w = wt, and the un-
informed player’s approximated security strategy τ¯ (wt)
is y∗
hA1
.
(iii) Choose an action b ∈ B according to the probability
τ¯λ,N (wt), and announce it publicly.
(iv) Read the informed player’s action, and update the anti-
discounted regret wt+1 according to (37).
(v) Update t = t+ 1 and go to step (ii).
4) The performance difference between the suboptimal
strategy and the security strategy: With the uninformed
player’s approximated security strategy τ¯λ,N , we are interested
in the worst case cost guaranteed by this strategy, which is also
called the security level of τ¯λ,N . Given an uninformed player’s
strategy τ ∈ T , the security level Jτ (p) in game Γλ(p) is
defined as
Jτ (p) = max
σ∈Σ
γλ(p, σ, τ). (66)
Since the uninformed player’s approximated security strategy
is derived from his approximated security strategy in the dual
game, the security levels of the approximated security strategy
in the primal and dual games are highly related. Hence, we
would also like to define the security level J˜τ (w) of τ ∈ T
in the dual game Γ˜λ(w) as
J˜τ (w) = max
p∈∆(K)
max
σ∈Σ
γ˜λ(w, p, σ, τ). (67)
Following the same steps as in the proof of (35-36) in [13],
[14], we can show that Jτ (p) and J˜τ (w) have the following
relations.
J˜τ (w) = max
p∈∆(K)
{Jτ (p) + pTw}, (68)
Jτ (p) = min
w∈R|K|
{J˜τ (w) − pTw}. (69)
Meanwhile, we also notice that in dual game Γ˜λ(w), the
security level J˜τ of a stationary strategy τ that depends only
on wt satisfies J˜
τ (w) = F˜J˜
τ
τ(w)(w).
Lemma 21. Let τ ∈ T be the uninformed player’s stationary
strategy that depends only on the anti-discounted regret wt.
The security level J˜τ of τ in a λ-discounted asymmetric in-
formation repeated game Γ˜λ(w) satisfies J˜
τ (w) = F˜J˜
τ
τ(w)(w),
where F˜τ(w) is defined in (57).
Proof. According to Bellman’s principle, we have
J˜τ (w) = max
p∈∆(k)
max
x∈∆(A)|K|

 ∑
a∈A,k∈K
pkxk(a)wk
+
∑
a∈A,k∈K
λpkxk(a)Mka,:τ(w)
+(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,x(a)max
σ∈Σ
γλ(π(p, x, a), σ, τ)
)
= max
p∈∆(k)
max
x∈∆(A)|K|
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯p,x(a)
(∑
k∈K π(p, x, a)(w
k + λMka,:τ(w))
1− λ
+max
σ∈Σ
γλ(π(p, x, a), σ, τ)
)
= max
x¯∈∆(A)
(1− λ)
∑
a∈A
x¯(a) max
p+∈∆(K)
max
σ∈Σ(∑
k∈K p
+k(wk + λMka,:τ(w))
1− λ
+ γλ(p
+, σ, τ)
)
=max
a∈A
J˜τ
(
w + λMaτ(w)
1− λ
)
= F˜J˜
τ
τ(w)(w)
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Now, we are ready to analyze the performance difference
between the approximated security strategy τ¯λ,N and the
security strategy τ¯∗.
Theorem 22. Consider a two-player zero-sum λ-discounted
asymmetric information repeated game Γλ(p) and the unin-
formed player’s approximated security strategy τ¯λ,N defined
in (60). The security level J τ¯λ,N (p) of τ¯λ,N in game Γλ(p)
satisfies
‖J τ¯λ,N − Vλ‖sup ≤
2(1− λ)
λ
‖Vλ − Vλ,N‖sup (70)
Proof. According to equation (69) and (36), we have
|J τ¯λ,N (p) − Vλ(p)| = |minw∈R|K|{J˜
τ¯λ,N (w) − pTw} −
minw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w)− p
Tw}. Let w∗ be the solution to the op-
timal problem minw∈R|K|{V˜λ(w) − p
Tw}. Since J τ¯λ,N (p) ≥
Vλ(p), we have
|J τ¯λ,N (p)− Vλ(p)| ≤ |J˜
τ¯λ,N (w∗)− V˜ (w∗)|
≤‖J˜ τ¯λ,N − V˜ ‖sup, ∀p ∈ ∆(K).
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 10,
we can show that ‖J˜ τ¯λ,N − V˜ ‖sup ≤
2(1−λ)
λ
‖V˜λ,N − V˜ ‖sup.
Therefore, we have ‖J τ¯λ,N − Vλ‖sup ≤
2(1−λ)
λ
‖V˜λ −
V˜λ,N‖sup. According to Equation (56), equation (70) is
proved.
IV. CASE STUDY: A NETWORK INTERDICTION PROBLEM
This section uses game theoretic tools to study a network
interdiction problem developed from [2], and provides security
strategies and approximated security strategies for both players
(attacker and network) in finite-horizon game and discounted
game, respectively.
Consider a network with a source node and a sink node.
There are two channels from the source node to the sink node.
One of them has high capacity of 3, and the other one has
low capacity of 1. Only the network knows which channel
has high capacity. The network needs to choose a channel to
use at each stage to maximize the throughput over a certain
horizon. Meanwhile, the attacker will either block one channel
with cost 1 or observe the usage of channels with cost 0 to
minimize the throughput over the same horizon. Notice that
the attacker can only detect whether a channel is in use, but
cannot measure the capacity of a channel. Our objective is to
design security or approximated security strategies for both
players.
The network interdiction problem is modeled as an asym-
metric repeated game with the network to be the informed
player and the attacker to be the uninformed player. The
network’s action is to either use channel 1 (1) or use channel 2
(2), and the attacker’s action is to observe (o), block channel 1
(1), or block channel 2 (2). The payoff matrices are provided
as in Table I. The initial probability that channel 1 has high
capacity is 0.5.
We first compute the security strategies and security levels
for both the network and the attacker in a 3-stage asymmetric
game according to Theorem 3 and 4, respectively. The linear
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX Mk IF CHANNEL k HAS HIGH CAPACITY
1 2 o
1 1 4 3
2 2 1 1
M1
1 2 o
1 1 2 1
2 4 1 3
M2
program used to compute the network’s security strategy
has 65 constraints and 35 variables, while the attacker’s LP
formulation has 44 constrains and 23 variables. The security
level of the network is 6.57 which meets the security level of
the attacker.
The security strategy of the network is given in Table II.
Consider the case in which channel 1 has high capacity. At
stage 1, the network uses the high capacity channel with
probability 0.64 instead of 1, because if the network reveals
the high capacity channel at stage 1, the attacker will block the
high capacity channel for the next two stages. At stage 2, if
channel 1 was used at stage 1, then the network thinks that the
attacker may guess that channel 1 has high capacity, and hence
the network reduces its probability of using channel 1 to 0.56.
Otherwise, the probability of using channel 1 is increased to
0.8. At the final stage, unless channel 1 is continuously used,
the network will use high capacity channel for sure.
The security strategy of the attacker is shown in Table
III. Notice that because the cost of blocking a channel is
low compared with the gain of blocking the high capacity
channel, the attacker prefers blocking channels to observing
channels. Therefore, for many cases, the attacker launches
attacks instead of observing channels unless he is almost sure
which channel has high capacity. In this case, because the
loss of blocking low capacity channel is higher than the loss
of observing channels (see Table I), the attacker would prefer
observing channels to blocking low capacity channel. At stage
1, since the initial probability over the states is [0.5 0.5], the
attacker will block either channel with equal probability. At
stage 2, the attacker will increase the probability of blocking
channel 1 by 0.04 if channel 1 is used at stage 1. Otherwise,
the probability of blocking channel 1 is decreased by 0.04. At
stage 3, if one channel was used continuously, the attacker’s
realized loss in the case that this channel has high capacity is
already high, so his strategy focuses more on minimizing the
payoff if the continuously used channel has high capacity, as
if he is playing only a single game.
The security strategies of both players are, then, used in the
3-stage network interdiction game. We ran the 3-stage game
for 5000 times, and the average total payoff of the network was
6.58 which was approximately the game value 6.57 computed
according to Theorem 3 and 4.
Next, we compute the approximated security strategies for
both players in a 0.7-discounted asymmetric repeated game.
According to Theorem 8, the network computes his approxi-
mated security strategy based on the approximated game value
Vλ,4. The game values from the discounted 1-stage game to
the discounted 4-stage game are presented in the left plot of
Figure 1. We see that the approximated game value converges,
and that the more unsure the attacker is about the high capacity
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TABLE II
NETWORK’S PROBABILITY OF USING CHANNEL 1
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤❤
channel with high capacity
H
A
t ∅ 1 2 11 12 21 22
1 0.64 0.56 0.8 0.4 1 1 1
2 0.35 0.20 0.44 0 0 0 0.6
TABLE III
ATTACKER’S BEHAVIOR STRATEGY
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Attacker’s action
H
A
t ∅ 1 2 11 12 21 22
1 0.5 0.54 0.46 0.68 0.49 0.51 0.04
2 0.5 0.46 0.54 0.04 0.51 0.49 0.68
o 0 0 0 0.28 0 0 0.28
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
1.5
2
2.5
initial probability that channel 1 has high capacity
V
λ
|n
 
 n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
attacker's belief that channel 1 has high capacity
0
0.5
1
pr
ob
. t
o 
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e 
ch
an
nl
e 
1
channel 1 has high capacity
channel 2 has high capacity
Fig. 1. The network’s approximated game value and suboptimal strategy in
the discounted asymmetric information game
channel, the higher throughput the network can get, and the
highest approximated game value is 2.24 when the initial
probability is [0.5 0.5]. The approximated security strategy
is given in the right plot of Figure 1. For both cases, the
probability of using channel 1 is lower if the network thinks
that the attacker has stronger belief that channel 1 has higher
capacity. Meanwhile, compared to the case in which channel
2 has high capacity (green dots), it is more possible for the
network to use channel 1 if channel 1 has high capacity (blue
crosses).
To compute the attacker’s approximated security strategy,
we first need to compute the approximated special initial regret
w⋆ according to Theorem 15, which is [−2.24;−2.24] for
N = 4. At each stage, the attacker computes his approximated
security strategy based on the anti-discounted regret wt with
w1 = w
⋆. We assume that the anti-discounted regret w2t if
channel 2 has high capacity is 2, and use the approximated
value V˜λ,4(wt) to compute the approximated security strategy.
The approximated game values V˜λ,N where N varies from
1 to 4 are presented in the left plot of Figure 2. We see
that the approximated game value converges over N , and
increases with respect to w1t . The attacker’s approximated
0 1 2 3 4
3
4
5
6
initial realized payoff when channel 1 has high capacity
V˜
λ
,T
 
 
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4
0 1 2 3 4
0
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0.4
0.6
0.8
anti−discounted realized payoff if channel 1 has high capacity
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block 1 block 2 observe
Fig. 2. The attacker’s approximated game value and suboptimal strategy in
the discounted asymmetric information game at stage 2
security strategy is shown in the right plot of Figure 2. When
w1t is relatively low compared with w
2
t , the attacker will block
channel 2 with higher probability to balance the payoffs of
both cases, as if he believes that it is more possible for channel
2 to have high capacity. Contrarily, when w1t is larger than
w2t , the attacker will block channel 1 with higher probability
to balance the payoffs of both cases, as if he believes that it
is more possible for channel 1 to have high capacity.
The approximated security strategies of both players are,
then, used in a 0.7-discounted network interdiction game.
Before running the game, we first anticipate the payoff of
the game. From equation (24), we have that
‖V λ|n‖
∆(K)
sup
1+(1−λ)N ≤
‖Vλ‖ ≤
‖V λ|n‖
∆(K)
sup
1−(1−λ)N
. Together with equation (31) and (24),
the network can guarantee a payoff |Jσλ,N (p)| ≥ (1 −
2(1−λ)N+1
λ
)
‖V
λ,N
‖∆(K)sup
1+(1−λ)N
= 1.96. Together with equation (70)
and (24), the attacker can guarantee a payoff |Jτλ,N (p)| ≤
(1 + 2(1−λ)
N+1
λ
)
‖V λ|n‖
∆(K)
sup
1−(1−λ)N = 2.59. Therefore, we anticipate
that the payoff is in the interval [1.96, 2.59]. When running
the game, we stopped at stage 10 since the sum of the payoff
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after stage 10 is less than 10−4. The 10-stage 0.7-discounted
game was ran for 100 times, and the average payoff is 2.35
which is within our anticipated interval, and demonstrates our
main results.
V. FUTURE WORK
This paper studies asymmetric repeated games in which
one player has superior information about the game over the
other, and provides LP formulations to compute both player’s
security strategies in finite-horizon games and approximated
security strategies in discounted games. In the future, we will
generalize these results to the case in which one player has
superior knowledge of one part of the information, while the
other player has superior knowledge of the other part.
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